【原文逐句解释】BM回怼V神：加密经济治理的局限性本文于3月30日发表在Daniel Larimer的m

本文于3月30日发表在Daniel Larimer的medium上，标题为 The Limits of Crypto-economic Governance。Daniel Larimer是EOS的创始人。以下为原文。

文章以区块律动3月30日发布的文章《V神谈EOS节点投票：我们必须绕开的阴影之地》的内容为起点讨论，BM在这篇文章中回应了V神对于以EOS为代表的DPOS投票选举机制的问题的质疑。

本译文由IMEOS提供翻译

Vitalik recently made claims that Delegated Proof of Stake (DPOS) results in rule by plutocracy (government by the wealthy). He then goes on to argue for governance by cryptoeconomics, the use of economic incentives and cryptography to govern.

Vitalik最近声称委托权益证明（DPOS）导致财阀统治（由富人统治的政府）。然后，他继续主张通过加密经济学进行治理，即使用经济激励和密码学来治理。

▲举个例子，Vitalik欢迎我们的人工智能的多载集合

My entire mission in life is based upon finding crypto-economic solutions for securing life, liberty, property, and justice for all. Vitalik and I are fundamentally striving for the same end goal: minimizing corruption and maximizing freedom in society. The primary difference between us are our fundamental assumptions.

我人生的全部使命就是建立在寻找加密经济的解决方案之上，以保障所有人的生命、自由、财产和正义。Vitalik和我根本上都在争取达到同样的目标：最小化社会的贪污腐败、最大化社会的民主自由。我们之间最大的不同是我们的基本假设不同。

There are three incontrovertible premise upon which I base my work:

1. The vast majority of people have good intentions

2. You cannot prove a negative

3. There is no such thing as a closed economic system

我的工作有三个不容置疑的前提：

1. 绝大多数人有良好的意图

2. 你不能举出反证

3. 不存在封闭的经济体系

Vitalik is looking for a cryptoeconomic blackbox that assumes you cannot rely voting whether by stake (plutocracy) or by individual (democracy). This blackbox needs to dispense candy for good inputs and electric shocks for bad inputs. The premise is that if we could only put the right algorithm inside the box then man can be free from rule of the wealthy. Vitalik is looking for the preverbal Dues ex Machina (God from the machine) to save mankind from its own tragic corruption.

Vitalik正在寻找加密经济的黑匣子，它假设你不能依靠权益（财阀政治）或个人（民主政治）来投票。这个黑匣子需要分配糖果以实现良好的输入（行为）和惩罚不良的输入（行为）。前提是假如我们把正确的算法放在盒子里，人们就可以摆脱富人的统治。Vitalik正在寻找Dues ex Machina（机器中的上帝）的预言成果，以拯救人类免受其自身的不幸的腐化。

I, on the other hand, am looking to create tools to be used by competing groups of good people where at least 2/3 are honest. I believe people are fundamentally good. Let’s look at the practical reality. The more effective a group is at maintaining its integrity as it grows, the larger the group will grow. The more corrupt a group is the faster it will die. Creating tools for competition in the free market recognizes the reality of open economic systems which is the foundation of true decentralization.

而我从另一方面寻找着创造一种工具供互相竞争的团体使用，这个团体中2/3的人是诚实的。我相信人性本善。让我们看看真实的情况。随着团队的成长，团队维持其诚信的效率越高，团队的规模就越大。一个团队越腐败就消亡得越快。在自由市场上创造竞争的工具来承认开放经济体系的真实性，这是真正去中心化的基础。

Part1·区块链视为一个广播电台

A blockchain can be viewed as a radio station that everyone in the world subscribes to and records. On this radio station anyone can broadcast cryptographic statements and everyone will process these statements via a deterministic state machine to arrive at consensus.

区块链可以被视为世界上每个人都可以订阅和记录的广播电台。在这个电台上，任何人都可以广播加密过后的声明，并且每个人都将通过确定性状态机来处理这些声明内容以达成共识。

The challenge we all face is determining which radio stations we care about, who gets to broadcast, and when do they get to broadcast.

我们都面临的挑战是确定哪些广播电台是我们关心的，谁可以广播，并且他们在何时广播。

Proof of Work systems as used by Bitcoin and Ethereum rely upon the loudest transmitter. Those with the most money have the power to broadcast over everyone else. Those without access to the physical resources to broadcast (power generation and transmission towers), must buy the air time from those with the resources. Furthermore, those with 51% of the transmitter power can jam those with 49%. This is rule by plutocracy.

比特币和以太坊所使用的工作量证明系统依赖于最大声的发报机。那些最有钱的人能够覆盖掉其他人的广播。那些无法使用物理资源（发电设备和输电塔）进行广播的人，必须从那些有资源的人那里购买广播时间。此外，那些具有51％发报机资源的人可以将49％的人堵塞。这就是财阀统治。

Proof of Stake systems give each person a percentage of the air time proportional to the amount of stake they have. This eliminates the need for a massive power station to override everyone else’s signal, but still requires you to have the ability to operate your transmitter 24/7 so it is ready to transmit when the time arrives. Those without the technological ability to operate a transmitter must buy airtime from those with ability. Those with 51% of the stake can ignore those with 49%. This is rule by plutocracy.

权益证明系统根据他们拥有的股权给予每个人一定比例的广播时间。这消除了让一个大型发电站来覆盖其他人的信号的需求，但仍然需要你有能力全天候操作你的发报机，以便在时间到达时准备好发射。那些没有技术能力操作发报机的人必须从有能力的人那里购买广播时间。拥有51％股份的人可以忽略那些拥有49％的股份。这是财阀统治。

Delegated Proof of Stake systems give each stakeholder the power to vote for the people who control the transmitter. This voting process is also stake weighted, but due to the nature of approval voting simply having a large stake is not sufficient to guarantee you some control over the transmitter. You must have approval by the majority of the voting stake to have control over the transmitter, this is a significantly higher threshold of approval than pure proof of stake. Unlike, pure Proof of Stake, it is possible for the voters to create a system where airtime cannot be purchased, but where the elected transmitters are expected to give everyone their fair share of air-time based upon their stake.

委托权益证明赋予每个权益相关者对发报机控制权投票的权力。这个投票过程也是按股权加权的，但由于认可投票制的性质，仅仅拥有大量股份并不足以保证你对发报机的控制权。你必须获得大多数投票权的批准才能控制发报机，这是一个比纯粹的股权证明更高的批准门槛。和纯粹的股权证明不同，选民可能可以创建一个无法购买广播时间的系统，但是被选择的发报机预计会根据他们的股份向每个人提供公平的时间份额。

There is a clear separation between those with control of the transmitter and those with stake and no one gets monopoly power to charge bribes to use the transmitter. Attempts to take bribes (fees) will result in loss of community support and removal. Stakeholders who support the corrupt transmitters can also be removed from the community.

这是一个对发报机控制人和权益相关者的明确分离，没有人可以获得垄断权力以收取贿赂来使用发报机。试图收受贿赂（费用）将导致失去社区的支持并从社区中被移除。支持腐败发报机的权益相关者也会被从社区中移除。

Part2·加密经济治理的局限性

Cryptography can only be used to prove logical consistency. It cannot be used to make subjective judgment calls, determine right or wrong, or even identify truth or falsehood (outside of consistency).

密码学只能用来证明逻辑一致性。它不能用来做出主观判断，也不能用来判断是非，更不能用来辨别真相或虚假（在一致性之外）。

The goal of all consensus algorithms is to determine the order of events. Due to the limits of speed of light and space time, every person will see events in a unique order. Two events generated at the same absolute time will be perceived at two different times depending upon how far away they originated. This means that all consensus depends upon selecting certain people to testify to an order of events. These people can be the ones with the largest transmitters, the ones with the most stake, the ones with the most stake-weighted votes, or the ones with the most democratic votes. They could be a benevolent notary, a committee, or any other group that people can agree on.

所有共识算法的目标是确定事件发生的顺序。由于光速和空间时间的限制，每个人都会以独特的顺序看到事件。在相同的绝对时间产生的两个事件将在两个不同的时间被感知，这取决于它们起源多远。这意味着所有共识都取决于被选中者证明事件的顺序。这些人可以是拥有最多发报机的人、拥有最多股权的人、拥有最多加权股份投票的人，或者拥有最多民主投票的人。他们可能是一位仁慈的公证人，一个委员会，或任何人们认同的团体。

The one thing that cryptography will never be able to prove is censorship. You cannot objectively prove that someone received your message unless said person cooperates by generating a cryptographic proof. Therefore, you cannot punish them for failing to include your transaction using objective cryptographic proofs.

密码学永远无法证明的一件事就是审查制度。你无法客观地证明有人收到了你的信息，除非这个人通过生成的密码学验证进行合作。因此，使用客观的密码学验证时，你不能因为没有包含你的交易信息而去惩罚那些接收信息的人。

This has HUGE implications for the design of Ethereum’s scaling solutions which rely upon cryptographic “challenge periods” during which “proof of bad behavior” can be submitted. The proof must first get approval of the radio transmitter or it will never be factored into consensus. If the radio transmitters are corrupt, then they can simply ignore the cryptographic evidence. Someone attempting to steal all the funds from a side-chain could simply bribe the transmitters with 50% of the take to censor a challenge proof. There would be no objective proof of the censorship and no way to slash the transmitters using crypto-economic means within the system.

这对以太坊的性能扩展解决方案有着巨大的影响，这些解决方案依赖于可以提交“不良行为证明”的加密“挑战期”。该证据必须首先得到无线电发报机的批准，否则将不会考虑到达成共识。如果无线电发报机损坏，那么他们可以简单地忽略密码证据。有人试图从一个侧链窃取所有资金，只需贿赂50％的发报机来审查挑战证明。由于没有审查的客观证据，也没有办法在系统内使用加密经济手段来减少这些被贿赂的发报机。

Part3·对强人工智能的依赖

If you are unwilling to trust any group of people to make judgments over subjective matters, then that implies that you are relying on artificial intelligence. This intelligence needs to be programmed with some definition of “right” and “wrong” and that definition must be measurable. Unless the AI system is omniscient, it must derive its conclusions from the potentially byzantine subjective inputs of individuals.

如果你不愿意相信任何人对主观事情做出的判断，那就意味着你依靠着人工智能。这种智能需要以“正确”和“错误”的定义来程序化，而且这个定义必须是可测量的。除非人工智能系统是无所不知的，否则它将从潜在的拜占庭节点的主观输入得出其结论。

Part4·未封闭的经济体系

The heart of cryptoeconomics is the ability to impose an economic gain or loss on an individual based upon cryptographic evidence. For such a system to work it must have cryptographic proof of the an individual’s internal and external positions, an impossibility. For example, in bond-weighted voting the assumption is that a person will be truthful for fear of losing their bond. The reality is that it is not possible to “prove” the economic exposure of an individual because they might have more to gain or lose outside the system than inside.

密码经济学的核心是根据密码证据对个人施加经济上的收益或损失。对于这样的系统来说，它必须具有个人内部和外部位置的密码证明，这是不可能的。例如，在债券加权投票中，假设一个人会因为害怕失去债券而诚实。现实情况是，不可能“证明”个人的经济风险，因为他们可能在内外获得或失去更多的收益或损失。

Part5·结论

Vitalik and I are both attempting to solve some very challenging problems in human governance. I have chosen to recognize certain realities regarding the limits of objective proofs and accept reality that each community might have its own definition of “right and wrong” which can only be measured by a poll of the subjective opinions of community members. The true goal is to lower the barrier to entry for the creation of new communities and allow free market competition to reward the most effective communities and punish the most corrupt.

Vitalik和我都试图解决人类治理中一些非常具有挑战性的问题。我选择承认某些关于客观证据范围的现实情况，并接受现实，即每个社区都可能有自己的“正确与错误”的定义，只能通过对社区成员的主观意见进行投票来衡量。真正的目标是降低创建新社区的准入门槛，并允许自由市场竞争来奖励最有效的社区和惩罚最腐败的社区。

The only way to maintain the integrity of a community is for the community to have control over its own composition. This means that open-entry systems built around anonymous participation will have no means expelling bad actors and will eventually succumb to profit-driven corruption. You cannot use stake as a proxy for goodness whether that stake is held in a bond or a shareholder’s vote. Goodness is subjective and it is up to each community to define what values they hold as good and to actively expel people they hold has bad.

维持社区完整性的唯一方法是让社区控制自己的组成。这意味着以匿名参与为基础的开放式进入系统将无法驱逐不良行为者，并最终屈服于利润驱动的腐败。你不能出于善良，以股份制的形式来选取代理人，无论该股份是持有债券还是股东投票。善良是主观的，每个社区都能定义什么样的价值观下是好人，并积极驱逐他们所认为的坏人。

The community I want to participate in will expel the rent-seeking vote-buyers and reward those who use their elected broadcasting power for the benefit of all community members Arather than special interest groups (such as vote-buyers). I have faith that such a community will be far more competitive in a market competition for mindshare than one that elects vote buyers.

我想参与的社区将驱逐那些只想着租赁的投票买家；并奖励那些利用选举出来的广播权为所有社区成员带来利益的人，奖励的那些人不是为了给特殊的利益群体（如投票卖家）带来利益。这样一个社区在选择投票买家的市场竞争中会更有竞争力。

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